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CHAPTER I
THE BASIC DEFINITIONS OF THE LEGAL TERMS
RELATING TO THE PRIEST-PENITENT PRIVILEGE
In everyday discourse the terms "communication,"
"confidence," and "privilege" are defined in a more general sense than in a court of law. It becomes necessary,
therefore, to define these terms more closely for the present study. Henry Campbell Black in his well-known legal
dictionary, Black's Law Dictionary, defines the term "communication" in the following manner:
Information given, the sharing of knowledge by one with
another; conference; consultation or bargaining preparatory to making a contract. A communication can be
either absolutely privileged or conditionally or qualifiedly privileged.'
Perhaps a more complete definition is found in volume fifteen
of Corpus Juris Secundum:
...the act of communicating. The term also means intelligence, news, that which is communicated or imparted,
a written or verbal message, something said by one person
to another. It is not restricted, however, to mere words,
but includes acts as well, embracing every variety of affairs which can form the subject of negotiation, interviews, or actions between two persons, and every method
by which one person can derive impressions or information
from the conduct, condition, or language of another.2
These definitions emphasize the legal aspect of the term.
"Communication" refers not only to words spoken between two
persons but also to the conduct, condition, and language of
a person. The term can also refer to written materials.
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The legal sense of the term "privilege" goes beyond
the ordinary meaning and has a variety of meanings under the
law. Basically, the term refers to "a right, power, franchise, or immunity held by a person or class, against or
beyond the course of the law."3 In this sense the parish
pastor in certain limited circumstances has the right or
immunity in a court of law not to testify to matters which
he has discussed with a person who has come to him for spiritual help. The "privilege" or right is described in volume fifteen of Corpus Juris Secundum in the following manner:
Certain classes of communications, passing between persons who stand in a confidential or fiduciary relationto each other (or who, on account of their relative situation, are under a duty of secrecy or fidelity), which
the law will not permit to be divulged, or allow them to
be inquired into in a court of justice, for the sake of
public policy and the good order of society. The phrase
describes only secret communications, the secrecy being
enjoined either actually or by implication, and so does
not include communications made for the purpose, or with
the expectation, of being disclosed, or those made in
the presence of others.4
The third term frequently referred to in relation to the
penitent-priest privilege is "confidence." The legal sense
of this term is more closely aligned with the definition afforded it in normal discourse. Black offered this definition
of the term:
Trust; reliance; ground of trust. It is as applicable
to the subject of trust, as nearly a synonym, as the
English language is capable of. Trust is a confidence
which one man reposes in another and confidence is a
trust.5
Often the terms "communication" and "privilege" are used
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in connection with one another in a legal sense and in this
present study. The term 'privileged communication" is defined with some degree of precision in volume fifteen of
Corpus Juris Secundum:
A communication communicated in confidence, privately
indorsed, secret, in reliance on secrecy....The term is
employed in the law with two significations. In one
sense it signifies oral or printed utterances which are
not actionable although defamatory, and in this sense
the term is treated in Libel and Slander paragraphs 67120. In another sense the term "privileged communication" has reference to communications made during the
existence of certain confidential relationships recognized by law and not competent to be produced in court
during the trial of a case.6
The basic meaning of "privileged communications" in this
study is information obtained during the course of counsel-

ing which a minister does with one who has sought his spiritual guidance. This information is legally exempt as evidence in a court of law under certain circumstances which
shall be taken up at the proper point in this study.

CHAPTER II
A STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Clergymen have traditionally been reluctant to divulge
information which they have received during the course of
spiritual guidance to individuals. Ministers have been
known to pay a fine and go to jail before revealing the contents of communications between them and their counselees.
The confidential information received by the clergyman has
been considered both professionally and ethically to be a
sacred trust. Wayne E. Oates refers to this covenant relationship in his book on pastoral counseling, Protestant
Pastoral Counseling:
A covenant of communication is much more than a promise
not to tell anything the person has said, which may or
may not be a wise thing to promise. A covenant of communication consists of a mutual understanding that both
the counselor and the couiggrjg will consult with each
other before either of them discusses their conversation
with anyone else. Thus, no one is told what has been
discussed without the permission of the other to do so.'
Although the confidential relationship which a lawyer
enjoys with his client and which a doctor has with his patient has been safeguarded under the law to great lengths,
the relationship which the parish pastor has with his spiritual guardians has not fared well at all under the law.
Presently fourty-four states have statutes concerning the
"priest-penitent Privilege" as it is commonly termed.8 This
does not mean that in every case where a clergyman has claimed
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the privilege in those forty-four states that it has been
granted. William Harold Tiemann refers to this fact in his
book, The Right to Silence:
The fact that a state has a statute on the priestpenitent privilege, however, does not guarentee that
a minister may be excluded from testifying as a witness
in a trial. In nearly all of the cases in which the
statute has been invoked, the courts have recognized
the rule, but have found that under the particular circumstances of the case it was not applicable.9
Under these circumstances the minister is confronted with a
serious ethical and professional problem. If he reveals
confidential information received during a counseling session he is neglecting his responsibilities toward those whom
he counsels. If he refuses to testify in a court of law he
runs the risk of fine and/or jail. In addition, the pastor
must have the complete trust and confidence of those whom he
counsels before any meaningful counseling can occur. The
justiceis opinion in the LeGore

v.

LeGore case pertains:

Any intermediary in a marital dispute must have the
confidence of both parties and must know the true
facts if he is to give effective guidance and counseling. Nothing could be more destructive of the trust
and confidence that the parties would place in him,
than the apprehension that he might later divulge what
was told to him in confidence. Marriage counseling
seeking to preserve the sanctity of marriage is most
important and is definitely within the functions and
duties of a minister. It is to be encouraged rather
than discouraged.10
Thus it behooves the minister to be well acquainted
with his legal rights in this area of counseling so that
(
211'\

he may more effectively minister to those who seek his guid-
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ance. This study is an effort to inform the parish pastor
of his rights in this area. It is written from the viewpoint and knowledge of a layman and is not an attempt to
present legal advice in any particular situation which might
occur during a pastor's functions as a counselor. It is
merely an attempt to lay the facts before him and hopefully
enable a more enlightened approach to the possible legal
pitfalls of the counseling situation. In every case where
there is a legal question involved the pastor should consult an attorney.
The scope of this paper is twofold. First there is a
brief history of the "priest-penitent privilege" under common law. Secondly there is a review of the privilege in the
fifty states and under the Federal jurisdictions. The number of cases and statutes concerning this privilege are too
numerous to be dealt with at length. Only representative
cases and landmark decisions are reviewed. The statutes
pertaining to the priest-penitent privilege are listed in
the Appendix of this paper. No attempt has been made to
analyze each statute, but there is an analysis of their content along the lines of narrow versus broadened statutes.
This has reference to whether a statute gives minimal protection to the minister or whether it provides more extensive coverage in this priest-penitent relationship.
Two important previous investigations into this problem
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should be mentioned. Fred L. Kuhlmannts article, "Communications to Clergymen--When Are They Privileged?" in the Spring,
1968, Valparaiso University Law Review,1 is an excellent overview of the problem from the viewpoint of a lawyer. The second major source is a book by Harold William Tiemann entitled,
The Right To Silence.12 Tiemann holds Bachelor of Divinity
and Master of Theology degrees from Austin Presbyterian
Theological Seminary and has down extenxive work in the area

from a minister's viewpoint.

CHAPTER III
THE PRIVILEGE UNDER COMMON LAW
A brief history of the priest-penitent privilege is in
order for a proper understanding of the status of the privilege in the courts of the United States today. During the
Middle Ages the priest-penitent privilege was not recognized
in the courts of England under what is termed common law.
Henry Campbell Black defines "common law" in his legal dictionary, Black's Law Dictionary.
...the common law is that body of law and juristic the-

ory which was originated, developed, and formulated and
is administered in England, and has obtained among most
of the states and peoples of Anglo-Saxon stock. As distinguished from law created by the enactment of legislatures, the common law comprises the body of those principles and rules of action, relating to the government
and security of persons and property, which derive their
authority solely from usages and customs of immemorial
antiquity, or from the judgements and decrees of the
courts recognizing, affirming, and enforcing such usages
and customs; and, in this sense, particularly the ancient
unwritten law of England
As concerns its force and
authority in the United States, the phrase designates
that portion of the common law of England...which had
been adopted and was in force here at the time of the
Revolution. This, so far as it has not since been expressly abrogated, is recognized as an organic part of
the jurisprudence of most of the United States.13
Basically common law is that body of law which is unwritten
by a state legislature but is a common rule of practice which
is followed in a court of law when there is no statute which
takes precedent.
Reference is also made to "statute." Black defines the
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term in the following manner:
An Act of the legislature declaring, commanding, or
prohibiting something; a particular law enacted and
established by the will of the legislative department
of government; the written will of the legislature,
solemnly expressed according to the forms necessary to
constitute it the law of the state....This word is used
to designate the written law in contradistinction to
the unwritten law.14
The common law history of the priest-penitent privilege
is one of almost constant rejection. Clergy were repeatedly
compelled to testify in the courts of England or face the
consequences, namely, contempt of court. Most authorities
agree that after the Restoration in England the privilege
did not exist under common law. The justice in a North
Carolina case, In re Williams, held a Baptist minister in
contempt of court for refusing to testify in a rape case and
made the following comment in his opinion on the case:
Apart from the statute, there is no privilege with reference to communications between clergyman, or other
spiritual advisor, and his colamunicants or other who
seek his advice and camfort.1,
Tiemann in his book, The Right to Silence, states: "The
commentators on the laws of evidence generally agree that
after the Restoration, the common law recognized no right
of privileged communications to clergymen."16 In another
place Tiemann states: "Under the common law, only two relations were recognized as privileged--those between attorney and client and those between husband and wife."17
Fred L. Kuhlmann concurs in this opinion with the following
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comment:
This statement coincides with the views of authorities
on the law of evidence and two New Jersey cases which
made clear that in the absence of a statute granting the
privilege the testimony of a clergyman can be compelled
under the common law. Moreover, there is considerablg
dicta to this effect in other state court decisions.10
The existence of the priest-penitent privilege before the
Restoration in England is attested by Edward A. Hogan in his
"A Modern rroblem on the Privilege of the Confessional" which
appears in the Loyola Law Review.
Through blind acceptance of Lord Coke,s gloss on the
statute of Articuli Cleri, American lawyers have failed
to discover the true nature of the privilege. The omission in Blackstoneis Commentaries which has often been
given great weight by the American bench and bar from
our earliest day, has led to calm acceptance of the proposition that no such privilege was known to common law.
More likely the privilege existed at early common law,
but subsequently was banned with the banning of the
Prayer Book of the Church of England.19
The importance of these comments is the fact that in
the absence of a statute the common law obtains. Since the
concensus is that the common law did not recognize the priestpenitent privilege, the result is that where there is no
statute recognizing the priest-penitent privilege the courts
have not recognized the privilege under common law. There
have been minor exceptions to this rule as we shall see.
A brief review of the major cases that have been decided
under common law is appropiate at this point. The cases reemphasize the point that the common law did not recognize the
priest-penitent privilege. The cases are arranged in chrono-

11
logical order to show the progression of thought in the
courts concerning the priest-penitent privilege.
The earliest on record case under the common law is
simply known as Anonymous (1693, England).20 Only one
phrase in Lord Chief Justice Holt.s opinion obtains.
Lord Chief Justice Holt declared that communications
with an attorney or scrivener were privileged; "for
he is counsel to a man with whom he will advise, if
he be intrusted and educated in such way of practice;
otherwise, of a gentleman, parson, etc." The meaning of the last ambiguous phrase is that the privilege would not apply to a pastor.21
In 1802 an Irish court decided the case of Butler v.
Moore.22 A Roman Catholic priest was called to testify to
the deceased final religious affliation. The heir of Lord
Bunboyne had attempted to prove that his ancestor who had
been a Catholic, joined the Anglican Church and later returned to the Catholic Church. If this could be proved
Lord Bunboyne was incapable of making a will to divide his
property. The heir would receive a larger share of the
estate than was provided in the will. When the priest was
called to testify he refused to testify on the grounds of
"confidential communications made to him in the exercise of
his clerical functions."23 Mr. Justice Smith ruled that the
privilege did not exist under common law and found the priest
in contempt of court. The priest was jailed.24
People v. Phillips25 was a New York case decided in 1013.
This case is of particular interest because it is one instance
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in which the court decided that a priest had the privilege
in the absence of a statute. Unfortunately the courts have
not followed this case and it is the only one on record
under state law in which the privilege was granted in the
absence of a statute.26
Another New York case decided in 1017 is simply entitled
Christian Smith's Case.27 In this murder case the Reverend
Peter J. Van Pelt, a Protestant minister, was called to testify concerning statements made to him as a minister of the
gospel. The defense counsel objected to the testimony but
Justice Van Ness ruled that the confession was not privileged.
He stated:
...there is a grave distinction, between auricular confessions made to a priest in the course of discipline,
according to the cannons of the church, and those made
to a minister of the gospel in confidence, merely as a
friend or adviser.28
The significance of this case is that it is the first case on
record in this country of an actual distinction being made
between the confessional of the Roman Catholi,. Church and
those communications made to Protestant ministers during the
course of their functions as a spiritual adviser.29
The Massachusetts case of Commonwealth v. Drake30 decided in 1818 did not consider penitential confessions to
fellow members of a church to be privileged information.
The charge was lewdness and involved a public confession
before a congregation. Tiemann reports that so far as he
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can determine no court has ever ruled that a public confession before a congregation is a privileged communication.31
In 1853 the common law case of Regina v. Griffin32
a chaplain of a workhouse was allowed not to testify in a
criminal case. However the fact that the chaplain did not
testify was more the result of the prosecution:s withdrawal
of its request for the chaplainls testimony than it was the
result of the judge's decision in the case. Although the
judge did state: "I do not lay this down as an absolute
rule; but I think that such evidence ought not to be given."33
It was on the basis of this statement that the prosecution
did not press for the testimony of the chaplain.
Regina v. Hu314- granted no privilege to a Catholic
priest who refused to testify as to who gave him a watch
which was charged as being stolen. The case was decided in
1860 in England. It is significant because it reveals how
difficult it is to determine the scope of the priest-penitent
privilege. A criminal came to a priest and handed over a
watch which he had stolen. He did this in the confessional.
Tiemann reveals the important point in this case.
Surely, the handing over of the watch by the thief to
the priest was as much an act of privileged communication as any penitential words spoken. By it, guilt was
acknowledged and confessed. At the same time we find
here an implied recognition that the confession itself
was a privileged communication.35
The judge in the case did not agree with the point of view
which Tiemann suggests. The justice made the following
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comment on the case.
...that statements made to a priest or clergyman in
sacramental or quasis sacramental confession are privileged, but anything said or done out of confession is
not so, even although its disclosure may incidentally
disclose the identity of the party.36
In a divorce case for the cause of adultery the English
court granted no privilege to the vicar of a church who had
heard certain admissions from the accused. In this 1893
case of Normanshaw v. Normanshaw37 the president of the
court summed up his opinion in the following words:
...each case of confidential communication should be
dealt with on its own merits, but ...it was not to be
supposed for a single moment that a clergyman had §ny
right to withold information from a court of law.3'
Cook v. Carrol (1945, Ireland)39 is an important modern
case under common law. This case will be dealt with at
length when we discuss the matter of who possesses the privilege. For the present it is sufficient to relate the background of the case and the pertinent assessment of Justice
Cavan Duff. The background is that a parish priest was called to testify in a seduction case. The priest refused on
the grounds of "confidential communication." Tiemann relates the opinion of the court in his own words.
In this case the Irish court pointed out that since the
privilege was not recognized under the common law of
England, the priest in England could be sentenced for
refusing to co-operate with the court. But the judge
went on to say that the common law of England is the
common law of Ireland only to the extent that the
English common law is not contrary to the national
independence and the public policy of Ireland. The
court then declared that the denial of privilege of the
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confessional was a heresy which developed in the postReformation period and was contrary to the public policy
of Ireland. The priest was not held in contempt for refusing to testify.40
Also the comments of Justice Gavan Duff himself are pertinent.
The issue here is governed by common law, not by any
Act of Parliament, and, while common law in Ireland and
England may generally coincide, it is now recognized that
they are not necessarily the same; in particular, the
customs and public opinion of the two countries diverge
on matters touching religion, and the common law in force
must harmonise with our Constitution.41
These cases under common law provide an important insight into the decisions in the courts today. Where a state
does not have a statute or where the statute is unclear in
its designations the courts in the United States today have
followed the common law rule of not recognizing the priestpenitent privilege. Tiemann states:
We may conclude that on the whole, privileged communication between priest and penitent has not fared well
under the common law. While there are exceptions, such
a privilege has not generally been recognized by the
courts. If our concern is genuine in this cause to
protect the penitential confidences between priest and
penitent, whatever his faith, then we must work to establish protection under statute law.42
With this comment in mind it is appropriate to review at this
point what the various state statutes and jurisdictions have
provided in the way of protection for the parish pastor from
possible prosectuion for refusing to testify to confidential
communications. The study of the priest-penitent privilege
or clergyman-privilege under the various state statutes and
jurisdictions will reveal how the courts have followed or not
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followed the common law of England and the United States.

CHAPTER IV
THE PRIVILEGE UNDER THE VARIOUS
STATE STATUTES AND JURISDICTIONS
The study of the priest-penitent privilege under the
various state statutes and jurisdictions will take the following format. First there is a discussion of the more important state statutes and their various implications. Included here is a discussion of the "construction" of the
statutes in the various jurisdictions of the United states.
Black's Law Dictionary defines the legal term, "construction,"
in the following passage:
The process, or the art, of determining the sense, real
meaning, or proper explanation of obscure or ambiguous
terms or provisions in a statute, written instrument,
or oral agreement, or the application of such subject
to the case in question, by reasoning in the light derived from extraneously connected circumstances or laws
or writings bearing upon the same or a connected matter,
or by seeking and applying the probable aim and purpose
of the provision.43
Black furthermore delineates between "strict construction"
and liberal construction":
Strict (or literal) construction is construction of a
statute or other instrument according to its letter,
which recognizes nothing that is not expressed, takes
the language used in its exact and technical meaning,
and admits no equitable considerations or implications.
Liberal (or equitable) construction, on the other hand,
expands the meaning of the statute to meet cases which
are clearly within the spirit or reason of the law, or
within the evil which it was designated to remedy, provided such an interpretation is not inconsistent with
the language used; it resolves all reasonable doubts in
favor of the applicability of the statute to the par-
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ticular case. Black, Interp. Laws, 262; Causey v.
Guilford County, 192 N.C. 298, 135 S.E. 40, 46. It
means, not that the words should be forced out of their
natural meaning, but simply that they should receive a
fair and reasonable interpretation with respect to the
objects and purposes of the instrumepp. Lawrence v.
McCalmont 2 How. 426, 11 L.Ed. 326. 44
The second portion of this chapter is devoted to a discussion
of the basic conditions under which the priest-penitent privilege has been recognized in the United States in recent history. This portion is based on a study of the important
cases which have been decided with reference to the various
state statutes.
Although forty-four states and the District of Columbia
have statutes which recognize the priest-penitent privilege,
none of them really protect the clergyman to the full extent
which he deserves. In six states there is no statute and it
is presumed that in the absence of a state statute the common law rule of no privilege obtains. Kuhlmann listed the
six states which have no priest-penitent privilege. They
are Alabama, Connecticut, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Texas,
and West Virginia.45
The states which do have statutes pertaining to the
privileged nature of communications to clergymen can be divided between those states which have a narrow definition
of the privilege and those which have a broadened definition.
Kuhlmann states that the following states have a broadened
statute concerning the priest-penitent privilege:
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California, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida,
Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia.46
The remaining states have statutes which could be defined
as "narrow" in their interpretation of the privilege. These
states are listed by Kuhlmann as follows:
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho,
Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Montana,
Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South
Dakota, ptah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. L+?
The reader is referred to the Appendix of this paper for a
verification of this data.
Of the states which have a narrow statute there are
certain characteristics which might be listed. A survey of
the Appendix of this paper which contains a complete listing
of the state statutes will reveal that those states which
have been listed as having a narrow statute use key phrases.
These key phrases are the following: "minister of the gospel,
or priest," "confessions," "in his professional character or
capacity," "in the course of discipline of his church." The
wording of these narrow statutes is so similar because they
have all been based on the first clergyman-privilege statute
to be enacted in the United States. This statute was passed
in 1926 by the New York state legislature and consisted of
the following single sentence:
No minister of the gospel, or priest of any denomination whatsoever, shall be allowed to disclose any con-
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fessions made to him in his professional character, in
the course of discipline enjoined by the rules of practice of such denomination.40
The key phrases found in this statute and reproduced in the
various state statutes which have a narrow privilege can be
construed in a variety of ways and have been in the various
state jurisdictions. The ambiguity of these terms argues
for more explicit statutes in these states.
The cases involving the narrow statutes are numerous.
Only in rare instances has a court bothered to determine whether the law requires a strict or a liberal
construction of privileged statutes, and the courts
which have expressly addressed themselves to this question have disagreed.49
Of those courts which have addressed themselves to the narrow statutes In re Swenson50 is the landmark case and has
been considered the clergyman's "bible" in those states which
have only a narrow definition of the priest-penitent privilege. This case was decided in 1931 before Minnesota broadened its statute. It is based on the 1927 Minnesota statute
which reads as follows:
A clergyman or other minister of any religion shall not,
without the consent of the party making the confession,
be allowed to disclose a confession made to him in his
professional character, in the course of discipline enjoined by the rules or practice of the religious body
to which he belongs.51
As we shall see the Minnesota Supreme Court construed this
statute liberally. Kuhlmann believes that the Swenson decision was questionable in its logic and conclusion.52
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The circumstances of the In re Swenson case are as follows. A Lutheran minister in Minneapolis had performed the
marriage ceremony for the Sundseth's and both had been members of his church. Mr. Sunseth was the trustee of the
church. He telephoned the pastor and asked for permission
to see him. The request was granted and he came immediately
to the pastor=s office. There he related to his pastor the
intimate affairs which were the cause for his wife's civorce
action against him.53
Of importance in the courts decision to uphold the privilege and not allow the Lutheran pastor to testify was the
statement by the court that a voluntary confession qualifies
for the privilege in the same manner as one made under the

"course of discipline" of a church such as the Raman Catholic
Church which makes confession a sacrament and requires it.54
The justice states the following opinion:
...The question is not the truth or merits of the religious persuasion to which a party belongs nor whether
the particular creed or denomination exacts, requires,
or permits a sacred communication, but the sole question
is, as suggested in Best on Ev. (12th Ed.) Sec. 585,
whether the party who bona fide seeks spiritual advice
should be allowed it freely.5
Here the Minnesota court construed the words "in the course
of discipline enjoined by the rules or practice of the religious body to which he belongs"56 to mean not only confessions made to Roman Catholic priests or others to whom confessions are required by their church but also those confes-
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sions which are voluntarily given and received.
Only four other cases uphold the priest-penitent privilege under narrow state statutes. They are Krugilov v.
KrugilovF Kohloff v. Bronx Savings Bank,58 Vickers v.
Stoneman,59 and Dehler v. State ex rel Bierck.60 These
cases are of minor importance since they did not establish
precedents. There is basically one importance in these cases.
They did uphold the clergyman-privilege in states which have
the narrow type of statute. These five cases do not offer
much encouragement to the clergymen who live in the twentythree states which have the narrow statutes. Kuhlmann considers this "...not the sort of judicial record to give encouragement to clergymen living in the twenty-three states
which have these archaic statutes, especially when there are
numerous cases decided under these statutes in which the
clergyman was permitted or compelled to testify.61
Several cases of major importance can be mentioned which
were decided under the narrow statutes and which construed
the statutes more strictly than was the case in the Swenson
trial. Knight v. Lee62 declared that the confessions to an
elder and a deacon of the Disciples of Christ Church are not
valid as privileged information. The term "clergyman" does
not mean an elder or a deacon. In Alford v. Johnson63 conversations with a Methodist minister were not held by the
Arkansas court to be made "in the course of discipline en-
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joined by the rules of practice of the Methodist churdh."64
In Johnson v. Commonwealth65 a minister of the Methodist
church had voluntarily visited an accused murder in jail.
The defendant, in the course of his conversation with the
pastor stated that he had lost his temper and killed the
deceased. Judge Rees of the Kentucky Court of Appeals
ruled that the conversation and resultant information was
not privileged because the conversation was not penitential
in character. Judge Rees made the following opinion:
It does not appear that the conversation between the
minister and appellant, during which the statement was
made, was connected in any way with the discipline of
the church. The statement was made in the same manner
it would have been made to any other visitor. The visit
of Mr. Dixon (Rev. J.L. Dixon) to the jail where the
appellant was incarcerated was voluntary on his part and
unsolicited. There is nothing in the record to indicate
that the appellant belonged to the Methodist Church or
any other denomination or that he made the statement in
question of some supposed religious duty.66
Here the Kentucky court construed the state statute in strict
terms. Finally, there is the case of Simrin v. Simrin67 in
the state of California. This case was decided in 1965 in
the same year in which California broadened its clergymanprivilege. The Simrin case was decided before the statute
in California was broadened. The case involved a rabbi who
engaged in marriage counseling with a couple who later divorced. In the divorce proceeding the rabbi was called to
testify.

The judge in the case ruled that the rabbi was not

privileged in this instance because the California statute
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did not apply to communications made to a marriage counselor.
There was no binding spiritual confession involved. Later
in the year the California statute was broadened to include
marriage counseling. The justice in the Simrin case offered
this comment:
It would wrench the language of the statute to hold that
it applies to communications made to a religious or spiritual advisor acting as a marriage counselor. We think
this result regrettable for reasons of public policy...
but the wording of the statute leaves us no choice.bd
These cases are just a sampling of the numerous decisions
under the narrow state statutes which have been construed
strictly.
In recent years states have broadened the clergymanprivilege. Kuhlmann comments on this fact.
Fifteen states in the past decade have either enacted
statutes for the first time or have liberalized statutes which had been on their books. Clergyman-privilege
has become a part of the law of evidence.bV
The states which have been listed as having the broadened
privilege display certain characteristics. The statutes
go beyond the simple term "confession" and use words such
as "communications," "information," "confidential communications," "disclosure," or "confidence." These statutes
often make it clear that the course of discipline of a minister includes his functions and duties as a minister and
not merely or simply the hearing of a confession.70 The
broadened statutes often include: (1) more explicit definitions of the term "clergyman"; (2) the inclusion of
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quasi-legal proceedings as qualified situations where the
privilege may be claimed; 72 (3) provisions for fines in the
event a clergyman should divulge confidential information in
a court of law;73 (4) provision for marriage counseling as
a bona fide course of discipline of the minister."'
Several specific state statutes are of interest. The
Florida statute broadened the concept of the minister's
duties as a counselor. The statute provides that a minister
will not be allowed or required to testify to confidential
communications
...properly entrusted to him in his professional capacity, and necessary to enable him to discharge the
functions of his office according to the usual course
of his practice or discipline.75
Blaes comments on this broadened concept.
The Florida statute sets up a standard for communications to the minister "according to the usual course
of his practice or discipline." It seems that the
standard of the minister's own "practice" is a much
broader concept than that of the discipline of a church.76
The Kansas statute is one that also deserves our attention. The Kansas statute broadens the concept of the
minister's discipline or obligation to include one who is
authorized
to administer the rites and ceremonies thereof
in public worship, and who as his regular and customary vocation preaches and teaches the principles
of religion and administers the ordinances of public
worship as embodied in the creed or principles of
such church, sect, or organization.7(
Thus not only confessions are admissible as privileged in-
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formation, but also information received in the minister's
course of duty as one who "preaches and teaches the principles of religion and administers the ordinances of public
worship as embodied in the creed or principles of such church."78
Blaes relates that the Uniform Rules of Evidence79 do not
contain this broadened concept.
The Uniform Rules of Evidence as drafted by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, from
which the entire Article Four of our New Code of Civil
Procedure was copied almost verbatim, do not contain
this broadened concept. The proposed Uniform Rule
Twenty-nine adheres tooIhe condition of a church disciplinary requirement.uu
The California statute found in Deering's California
Codes81 is of interest because of its rather precise definition of terms. The terms "clergyman" and "penitential
communication" are explicitly defined. In addition the
clergyman has possession of the privilege as well as the
penitent. Thus the clergyman can prevent the penitent from
testifying in court to confidential information he has received from the penitent. The Law Revision Commission
Comment as found in Deering's, California Codes, made this
assessment.
This section provides the clergyman with a privilege
in his own right. Moreover, he may claim this privilege even if the penitent has waived the privilege
granted him by Section 1033. 63
The Georgia statute uses the terms "every communication" and "by any person professing religious faith." These
terms leave considerable room for a liberal construction of
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the statute and favors the granting of the privilege for the
clergyman. The statute reads as follows:
Every communication made by any person professing religious faith, or seeking spiritual comfort, to any
Protestant minister of the Gospel, or to any priest of
the Roman Catholic faith, or to any Christian or Jewish
minister, by whatever name called, shall be deemed privileged. No such minister, priest or rabbi shall disclose any communications made to him by any such person
professing religious faith, or seeking spiritual guidance, or be competent or compellable to testify with
reference to any such communication in any court.84
In the states which have broadened their clergymanprivilege two cases seem to stand out as being important in
relation to the manner in which they construed these liberal
or broadened statutes. These are LeGore v. LeGore65 and
In re Williams.86 LeGore v. LeGore construed the Pennsylvania
statute liberally. The In re Williams case in North Carolina
was construed strictly.
In LeGore v. LeGore the justice in the Appelate court
ruled that the lower trial court had wrongfully admitted
testimony of a clergyman in a divorce proceeding. The justice liberally construed the words in the Pennsylvania statute which follows.
No clergyman, priest, rabbi or minister of the gospel
of any regularly established church or religious organization, except clergymen or ministers, who are selfordained or who are members of religious organizations
in which members other than the leader thereof are
deemed clergymen or ministers, who while in the course
of his duties has acquired information from any person
secretly and in confidence shall lore compelled, or allowed without consent of such person, to disclose that
information in any legal proceeding, trial or investigation before any grand jury, traverse or petit jury,
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or any officer thereof, before the General Assembly or
any committee thereof or before any commission, department or bureau of this Commonwealth, or municipal body,
officer or committee thereof.87 (Italics mine)
Here communications to clergymen in marriage counseling were
considered privileged. The appropiate part of the judge's
opinion in this case is found on page five of this paper and
footnote number ten relates the source of this opinion.
In re Williams was a strict construction of a liberal
or broadened statute in North Carolina. A Baptist minister
refused to testify in a rape case on the grounds that it
would violate his duty as a Chrisitan minister and that he
did not wish to take sides. Both the prosecution and the
defence had no objection to the minister's testimony yet he
persisted in his refusal to testify. The judge round him in
contempt of court and sentenced him to ten days in jail.
The judge strictly adhered to the state statute which provides that "this section shall not apply where communicant
in open court waives the privilege conferred."6d
It remains to be determined under what general conditions the privilege has been granted in the jurisdictions of
the United states today. Although the statutes vary considerably, there are general conditions under which the
clergyman-privilege and the clergyman's professional relationships are recognized in most of the states. It must
be remembered that the narrow statutes are less likely to
allow the clergyman these rights and that the conditions
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discussed in the following discourse may not apply in those
jurisdictions which have the narrow statute.
Kuhlmann suggests that there are four basic tests or
requirements to be met before communications to clergymen
will be recognized as privileged under the narrow statutes.
1.The communication must be made to a clergyman.
2. The communication must be a "confession."
3.The confession must be made to the clergyman in his
professional character.
L. The communication must have been made "in the course
of discipline enjoined by the rules of practice" of the
clergyman,s denomination.89
The terms "clergyman," "confession," "in his professional
character," and "in the course of discipline enjoined by the
rules of practice" have been construed strictly by most courts.
Clergymen in those twenty-three states which have the narrow
statute find that in the majority of the cases decided in
their respective states the courts have not allowed the privilege. Tiemann states:
The tendency of the courts is
tion of those statutes making
men privileged, and, usually,
are privileged which are made
enumerated in the statutes.90

toward a strict construecommunications to clergyonly those communications
under the exact conditions

The first general requirement for the privilege is usually that it be made to a "clergyman." Courts have ruled
and a few statutes explicitly indicate91 that person who is
self-ordained is not to be classified a clergyman and is not
entitled to the privilege. Also courts have ruled that an
elder of a church or a deacon does not qualify as a clergy-
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man. There is one exception to this rule in the case of
Reutkemeier v. Nolte92 in the Iowa Supreme Court (1917).
The court
...acknowledged that in the Presbyterian Church the
Session stands in much the same disciplinary relationship to the members of the congregation as the priest
alone does in the Roman Catholic Church. Whether this
ruling would apply to other denominations having ordained officers charged with the spiritual discipline
of the congregation is not known. But the logic would
seem to point that way.93
The next requirement for the clergyman-privilege seems
to be that the communication must be in the form of a confession. This is not true in the more liberal state statutes
which allow communications during marriage counseling to be
classified as privileged. For instance see the statutes of
California, Delaware, and the District of Columbia in the
Appendix of this paper. Yet the majority of the statutes in
the United States today require that the communications to
the clergyman be "confessions." Some states are less strict
as to the meaning of this term than other states. Many states
require that the statements to the clergyman must be penitential in character. The person must be seeking spiritual consolation or forgiveness for sin. The Kansas statute requires
that the person must believe in God. In Section Four it
states:
"penitent" means a person who recognized the existence
and the authority of God and who seeks or recives from
a regular or duly ordained minister of religion advice
or assistance in determing or discharging his moral
obligations, or in obtaining God's mercy or forgiveness
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for past culpable conduct.94
Other states and court rulings have determined that "confessions" can mean voluntary penitential statements as opposed to those which are required by a church rule or discipline. Here the case of In re Swenson applies.95
The third requirement is that the statements be made
to the clergyman during his capacity as a clergyman and in
his "professional character." In a case entitled, McGroganis
Will96 the court ruled that a simple matter of a minister
receiving two checks totalling $5000.00 coupled with a voluntary expression from the deceased to the effect that the
church would get all of her money upon her death was not
related in a spiritual advier relationship. The minister
was not acting in his professional capacity as a spiritual
adviser. In People v. Gates97 admissions to the president
of a consistory of a church were not held to be made to the
president in his professional character as a clergyman. It
can be said that where the minister is acting solely as an
agent for a person or advising him concerning matters outside the realm of spiritual guidance those statements may
not be held to be privileged in a court of law.
Statements by parishioners or others to a clergyman
to the effect that another person has comitted a crime or
statements that reveal information about another person are
not held to be privileged. They are not penitential; they
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do not confess sin but only reveal it. Yet it must be remembered that several states do cover these types of communications also. As was mentioned, marriage counseling is
one instance were non-penitential statements are covered in
some states by the clergyman-privilege. The Delaware statute pertains here.98
The fourth general requirement for the clergymanprivilege is that it be made "in the course of discipline
enjoined by the rules of practice" of a particular church or
denomination. This implies that the statements to the clergyman must not only be a confession but they must be required
by the church and its teachings. In most cases this would
mean that only the Roman Catholic church would qualify, but
most jurisdictions have broadened the concept so that other
churches can claim the privilege. The Minnesota Supreme
Court in the case of In re Swenson stated this broadened
concept in the following terms:
It is important that the communication be made in such
a spirit and within the course of "discipline" and it
is sufficient whether such "discipline" enjoins the
clergyman to receive the comilnication or whether it
enjoins the other party, if a member of the church, to
deliver the communication. Such practice makes the
communication privileged, when accompanies by the essential characteristics, though made by a person not a
member of the particular church or of any church. Man,
regardless of his religious affliation, whose conscience
is shrunken and whose soul is puny, enters the clergymanis door in despair and gloom; he there finds consolation and hope. It is said that God through the
clergy resuscitates. The clergymen practise the thought
that "the first of all altars is the soul of an unhappy
man who is consoled and thanks God."99
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Hare the confession of a man who is not a member of a church
is regarded as privileged. Obviously a man who is not a member of a church could not be under any discipline of the
church to engage in confession since he does not belong to
a church. Yet the clergyman may or may not be under such a
discipline. Thus the traditional statute phrase that a confession must be made "under the discipline of a church and
its rules" is not explicit as to whethdr the "discipline enjoined" refers to the fact that a given clergyman must hear
confession under the rules of his church or whether a given
parishoner must make confession. Either possibility could
be meant by the indeterminant phrase "in the course of discipline enjoined by the church to which he belongs." Many
of the broadened or newly enacted statutes have moved away
from this type of phraseology.
Wigmore in his treatise entitled, A Treatise on the
100
Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law,
states that the following four requirements should be met
in order that the clergyman-privilege might be granted:
1.The communications must originate in a confidence
that they will not be disclosed;
2.This element of confidentiality must be essential
to the full and satisfactory maintence of the relation
between the parties;
3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of
the community ought to be sedulously fostered;
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the
disclosure of the communication must be greater than
the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal
of litigation.101

34These requirements are reflected in the foregoing discussion
concerning Kuhlmann's four requirements which he has listed.
Several particular situations remain to be discussed in
relation to the pastors counseling situations. It might be
asked: Are written materials considered to be confidential
information under the clergyman-privilege? In Colbert v.
State,102 a trial for arson, a priest of a village had received an anonymous letter confessing the crime of arson.
The priest took the letter to the defendants residence and
read it to her. He later testified in court that she was
excited and wrote at his dictation and gave him a statement
that no stranger spoke to her on the date of the fire, and
that the letter was unknown to her. The priest testified
in court that the handwriting of the original letter and that
of the written statement were the same. The written statements were admissible as evidence in the trial.
In Allen v. Lindeman Kuhlmann reports that
...the Iowa court compelled a clergyman to produce certain letters as evidence in an alienation of affection
suit. The letters had been found by the defendant's
wife in the defendant's home and had been delivered by
her to her pastor for safekeeping. The court said it
was dealing with an independent document and not a direct
communication, and that if such evidence were to be excluded, justice could be thwarted simply by delivering
important papers to a clergyman.103
Kuhlmann also reports that in the case where a rector received written statements from a man charged with bigamy the
statements were not privileged. In the Hills v. State104
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case the defendant had written out points he wanted the rec105
tor to bring before his wife.
It appears that written statements are not exempt from
disclosure in a court of law. The clergyman is best suited
in a counseling situation if he does not make any written
account of the discussion and if he does not accept written
materials from those whom he counsels. Joslin makes a good
point along these lines in the following statement:
In most cases, it is also very important that these
innermost secrets communicated to the minister not be
recorded in writing by the minister, nor any memorandum
made which would divulge the confidence. They should
be retained only in the memory of the minister.106
Another point to consider is whether the clergymanprivilege remains in effect when a third party has overheard the confidence whether planned or not. Tiemann gives
his viewpoint in these words:
The courts have generally held that when a privileged
communication is overheard, whether by accident or
design, by some person not a member of the privileged
relation or a necessary intermediary, such a person
may testify as to the communication. In fact, he is
said to be absolutely unaffected by the rule of privilege.107
There seems to be no precedent upon which Tiemannis opinion
can be based. But in the absence of a court ruling on this
matter it is best to concur with Tiemann that the person who
overhears a privileged communication can and may be compelled
to testify in a court of law.
The question arises as to whether the observations which
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the clergyman makes during the course of his counseling duties
is privileged information. For instance, can the minister
be compelled in a court of aiw to testify as to the physical
or mental condition of his counselee? Evidently he can and
may be compelled to testify. In Boyles v. Cora (Iowa, 1942)
a clergyman was compelled to testify concerning observations
he made in a counseling situation.lo8 The case of Buuck v.
Kruckenberg is more significant. Justice Crumpacker of the
Appellate Court of Indiana made the following comments in a
reversal of a lower court opinion.
On this testimony the witness was asked to express his
opinion as to the soundness of mind of Currie Blume on
the 31st day of January, 1947. The appellee objected
to the question and upon the objection being sustained
moved to strike out the entire testimony of the witness
which motion was also sustained.
These rulings were made upon the theory that the testimony of the witness concerned matters communicated to
him as a clergyman as to which he is made an incompetent
witness by Burnsi Statute Paragraph 2-1714. The statute,
however, made the witness incompetent only as to "confessions or admissions" made to him "in course of discipline enjoined by" his church. It is apparent that
the testimony of Rev. Hofius concerned neither a confession nor an admission on the part of Carrie Blume
made to him in the course of any disciplinary action
enjoined upon him by his church. He was clearly a competent witness and it was error to strike out his testimony and to refuse to receive his opinion based thereon as to Carrie Blumels soundness of mind.109
The case of Sdhaefferis Estate (Pennsylvania, 1941) concurred
in the opinion that personal observations are not exempt from
a court of law.110
There remains the question of possession of the privilege.
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The legal question divides along the line of reasoning that
privileges usually must be claimed and do not exist when there
is no claim to them. The consideration of the clergymanprivilege poses the question: does the counselee alone have
the privilege or right to exclude testimony in a court of law
or does the pastor also have the right to exclude testimony
even when the counselee wishes that the testimony be given?
A justice commented on the attorney-client privilege in
the following manner:
The privilege of nondisclosure belongs to the client
alone (Svenson v. Svenson, New York Reports, Vol. 178,
p. 54) and' disclosure Should not be compelled when a
clientls liberty is at stake in criminal trial.111
This opinion has generally been followed in relation to the
clergyman-privilege. In Gill v. Bouchard (Quebec, 1896)112
the Quebec court determined the opposite opinion, though.
This case does not seem to set a precedent.
1,-, 113
is an important case
Cook v. Carrol (Ireland, 194')
under common law in determing the possession of the privilege.
Here the justice determined that the privilege resided with
the priest alone. The justice gave his reasoning.
As between himself and his attorney, the client is master of the situation, so that if he thinks fit to waive
his privilege, the privilege disappears and the lawyer,
his paid servant, cannot set it up. But the priest is
not hired, and a parishioners waiver of privilege should
not, as a matter of course, destroy the priest=s right
to keep his secret, where the sacerdotal privilege is
regulated by law; ...to protect the priest against having to testify is only a half-measure of justice, if
others may blurt out the conversation; the essential
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foundation of the relation established is the acceptance
from the outset by all concerned of the inviolable
secrecy of the meeting under the aegis of the parish
priest; that is the capital consideration, and we must
protect confidences which would never have been exchanged
at all but for the absolute and implicit faith of his
two parishioners in him. If in a crisis his extraordianary prestige as parish priest is utilized, we cannot afterwards, having gotten his aid in the closest
secrecy, treat him as a cipher, a mere onlooker, whose
determination to have the secret guarded may be ignored
as soon as one of the contestants seeks to get the better of the other by broadcasting it.114
The Cook v. Carrol is an exception to the rule that the penpenitent alone possesses the privilege.
There is a definite need for the clergyman to have the
right or possession of the privilege in his own right. This
was reflected in the opinion of Justice Gavan Duff as quoted
above. The need is especially evident in marriage counseling.
Kuhlmann comments on this aspect.
Either party...should be able to claim the privilege
even though the other may be willing to waive it. Thus,
if a husband consult a clergyman with regard to marital
difficulty and learns from the clergyman certain facts
which he subsequently would like to introduce into
evidence in a divorce proceeding, the clergyman should 115
be in a position to prevent a breach of the confidence.
There is concrete evidence that the statutes are moving in
this direction as is evidenced in the California statute passed in 1965 and ouoted fully in the Appendix. Here is the
pertinent phrase:
Subject to Section 912,116 a clergyman, whether or not
a party, has a privilege to refuse to disclose a penitential communication if he claims the privilege. 117
The Law Revision Commission in California made this comment
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as regards the new California statute:
This section provides the clergyman with a privilege
in his own right. Moreover, he may claim this privilege even if the penitent has waived the privilege
granted him by Section 1033. 110
This is only one statute in one state. There remains a great
need to grant the privilege to the pastor in the fullest sense
of the term.
Before this discussion of the clergyman-privilege in the
fifty states is brought to a conclusion there are two minor
points of interest. A reading of the statutes as listed in
the Appendix of this paper reveals two technicalities. First
certain statutes provide that the clergyman-privilege is
granted only in civil cases or only in criminal cases. The
Virginia statute provides:
No regular minister of religion,...snall be required
in giving testimony as a witness in any civil action
to disclose any information communicated to him in a confidential manner, ...119
It seems that the Louisiana situation is similar. Kuhlmann
states in parentheses next to his listing of the Louisiana
statute that it is "apparently applicable only to criminal
cases."120 Kuhlmann.s reason for this comment is probably
that under the clergyman-privilege in Louisiana the statute
is found only in the Louisiana Criminal Procedures Code121
and not in the Louisiana Civil Procedures Code. In several
states the statutes explicitly state that the clergywanprivilege pertains in both civil and criminal actions. The
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minister should be aware of the situation in his own statute.
The California statute reveals a technical point of law
that should interest the pastor. Under Section 912, entitled,
122 sub"Waiver of Privilege," of the California Evidence Code
section "c" relates: "A disclosure that is itself privileged
is not a waiver of any ixivilege."123 Thus the person who
comes to the pastor and relates privileged information obtained in the husband-wife relationship which is privileged
under law does not waive this husband-wife privilege by revealing to the pastor in confidence the information obatined
in the marital relationship. Another example of this technicality is where a physician consults a physician who is a
specialist and consequently reveals the information derived
from his patient. This: does.not negate the patients privilege. The pastor is under an obligation to prevent his parishioner's privilege from being waived by his own actions.
Thus he should refrain from revealing confidences to those
whom he consults if at all possible.
In some cases this is impossible. For instance the
pastor may see the need to consult a sychiatrist or other
professional and refer a parishoner to such a person. The
law does not always protect the clergyman who reveals confidences to other professionals. In this case the clergyman is definitedly in an inferior position to the physician
or lawyer who more often than not finds protection under the

law in this respect.
This concludes the discussion of the clergyman-privilege
under the various state jurisdictions. The conclusions of
this study of the problem at the state level are incorporated
with the conclusions at the end of this paper in Chapter Six.

CHAPTER V
THE PRIVILEGE IN THE kEDERAL JURISDICTIONS
The clergyman-privilege under Federal jurisdictions is
uncertain. There are no Federal statutes concerning the
privilege. In general the laws and statutes of the various
states pertain in the Federal jurisdictions. In other words
the laws of the state in which litigation begins govern the
Federal courts in their decisions unless the state law contradicts Federal statutes or the Federal Rules of Civil and
Criminal Procedure.124 Kuhlmann attests to the fact that
the clergyman-privilege is uncertain in the Federal jurisdictions:
The status of the clergyman-privilege in Federal courts
is uncertain. If it exists at all, it is difficult to
say how far it extends. There is no Federal statute on
the matter and the Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal
Procedure do not deal specifically with the subject.
There are, however, two Federal cases which recognize
the privilege.125
The two Federal cases, United States v. Keene7126 and Mullen
v. United States,127 will be discussed subsequently.
First it should be mentioned that there is a statute on
the clergyman-privilege in the District of Columbia. The
statute reads as follows:
An act to prohibit the examination in District of Columbia
courts of any minister of religion in connection with
any communication made to him in his professional capacity, without the consent of the party to such communication.
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Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives
of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
that no priest, clergyman, rabbi, practitioner of Christian
Science, or other duly licensed, ordained, or consecrated
minister of any religion authorized to perform a marriage ceremony in the District of Columbia shall be examined in any civil or criminal proceedings in the courts
of the District of Columbia-(1)with respect to any confession, or communication
made to him, in his professional capacity in the course
of discipline enjoined by the church or other religious
body to which he belongs, without the consent of the
person making such confession or communications, or
(2)with respect to any communication made to him, in
his professional capacity in the course of giving religious or spiritual advice, without the consent of the
person seeking such advice, or
(3)with respect to any communication made to him, in
his professional capacity, by either spouse, in connection with any effort to reconcile estranged spouses,
without tip consent of the spouse making the cammunication.120
This provision is more extensive than most of the state
statutes. It recognizes marriage counseling as a bona fide
spiritual relationship between pastor and counselee. The
statute seems to allow more room for a liberal construction
than do most state statutes.
Although Congress has seen fit to pass the statute on
clergyman-privilege for the District of Columbia, it has
failed to pass a Federal statute on the matter. On February

6, 1959, Senator Kenneth B. Keating introduced Senate bill
965 which would have granted such a privilege to clergymen
in the Federal courts or before committees of Congress. He
sought to amend Chapter 119 of Title 28, of the United States
Code, by inseritng immediately following Section 1825 the

following new section entitled 1826:
1826. Privilege of clergymen and news reporters.
(1)A clergyman, or other minister of any religion,
shall not be allowed in any court of the United States
to disclose a confession made to him, in his professional character, in the course of discipline enjoined
by the rules or practice of the religious body to which
he belongs.
(2)A person emaged or employed in the work of gathering, compiling, editing, publishing, disseminating,
broadcasting or televising news shall not be required
in any court of the United States to disclose the
source of information procured by him for such publication, broadcasting or televising unless such disclosure is necessary in the interest of national security.129
The bill died in committee. Two other bills were introduced
in the House of Representatives by Representative Multer of
New York on January 27, 1959, but they too died in committee.
Not only has Congress sought action on the clergymanprivilege on the Federal level, but also the United Nations
has seen the need for such a privilege. The United Nations
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection
of Minorities under the chairmanship of Arcot Krishnaswami
recently compiled a "Study of Discrimination in the Matter
of Religious Rights and Practices." This study produced
sixteen rules for dealing with problems involved in this
area. Rule fifteen of the study makes the following statement:
No cleric who receives information in confidence, in
accordance with the prescriptions of his religion,
should be compelled by public authorities to divulge
such information.130

Before the discussion of the two important Federal cases
is undertaken something should be explained more fully at
this point. The Federal courts generally follow the state
statutes in which the Federal court sits. Also the construction of the state statute in the state court is usually
binding in a Federal court. This rule of practice is found
in volume fifty-eight of American Jurisprudence under paragraph 364:
In a civil action in the Federal court, the statutes
of the state in which the court sits determine the
admissibility of evidence which is objected to as being privileged communication. The construction of the
statute in the state court is likewise binding on the
Federal court.
As to criminal cases, the privileges of witnesses are
governed by the principles of the common law unless
provided otherwise by act of Congress or the Rules of
Criminal Procedure.1i1
It is appropiate at this point to discuss the two
132
Federal cases mentioned earlier. Mullen v. United States
is of particular interest. This case involved confessions
made to a Lutheran minister by a woman who was not a member
of the pastor's church. The pastor had promised spiritual
aid and comfort to the woman if she confessed.
The woman was Carolyn Mull.en. She was the mother of
several children. Carolyn Mullen was accustomed to chaining her children in her house while she was absent. The
woman was tried in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia and was convicted under a Federal
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statute making it a crime to torture, beat cruelly, abuse,
or otherwise willfully mistreat a child. The appeal of her
case was heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit on November 21, 1958. The
decision which was handed down on December 4, 1958, reversed
the lower court's conviction. Part of the grounds for reversal was that the testimony of the Lutheran pastor was privileged information.
One important aspect of this case is that although the
Federal courts generally follow common law in the absence of
a statute,133 this Federal court in effect ruled that the
common law was obsolete. The judge stated in the case:
...recognition of the privilege in Federal courts does
not depend upon finding that it has either existed
uniformly at common laF or has been approved in terms
by acts of Congress.134
At another point in Judge Fahyis opinion he states the following principle:
It thus appears that non-recognition of the privilege
at certain periods in the development of the common
law was inconsistent with the basic principles of the
common law itself. It would be no service to the common law to perpetuate in its name a rule of evidence
which is inconsistent with the foregoing fundamental
guides furnished by that law. And...the denial was
never uniform or resolute, so strong were the claims
of reason in support of the privilege.135
Judge Fahy further comments:
When reason and experience call for recognition of a
privilege, which has the effect of restricting evidence,
the dead hand of the common law will not restrain such
recognition.136
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This is a Federal case which upheld the clergyman-privilege
and disregarded the common law rule of no privilege in the
absence of a statute. Kuhlmann offers this comment upon
the courts decision:
Whether other Federal courts will follow this interpretation, whether they will follow it in civil cases,
and under what circumstances they will recognize the
privilege, are all unanswerable questions at this
time.13(
In any event the case of Mullen v. United States is an historic decision and offers some encouragement that the privilege may be recognized on the Federal level.
The other Federal case on the clergyman-privilege is
United States v. Keeney.138 This was a prosecution of a
former United Nations employee for contempt of Congress for
refusing to answer a question while testifying before a
Senate subcommittee. On the motion for acquittal the District
Court Justice Holtzoff held that the information which the
committee sought as to whether anyone in the State Department
aided her in obtaining employment with the United Nations was
not privileged even under the rules and regulations of the
United Nations.139
Although the case did not involve privileged information
between a clergyman and a penitent the court did comment on
the existence of the clergyman-privilege in passing. Judge
Holtzoff in his opinion stated:
The subject of privileged communications is within the
field vf municipal law and is governed by the law of

the United States and not by any principle of international law. Under the law of the United States privileged communications are strictly limited to a few
well-defined categories, such as communications between
attorney and client, clergyman and penitent, and physician
The law does not recognize that communand patient
ications between an employer and employee are privileged,
even though there may be a moral duty not to disclose
such communication except when ordered by a competent
tribunal.140
Kuhlmann makes this comment on the judgels opinion:
It would be interesting to know how the court reached
this unqualified and positive conclusion--but no authority is cited and no reasons are given.141

This concludes the discussion of the clergyman-privilege
at the Federal level. The conclusions of this study at the
Federal level will be drawn in the next chapter.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
It has been shown that the clergyman-privilege in the
various jurisdictions of this nation is not as well established as many clergyman may suppose it to be. The Federal
courts have made few comments upon the privilege and their
is no Federal statute to guide their decisions. It seems
that the privilege at the Federal level of jurisdiction is
at least questionable. Mullen v. United States is the case
which may offer the most encouragement to the clergyman,
but the ruling of the court in this case is an exception to
the rule. Thus it is doubtful whether Federal courts in the
future will follow the Mullen case as a precedent.
The states which do have statutes on the books concerning the privilege often do not offer the protection which
clergymen deserve in the types of counseling which they
undertake. The cases which have been decided in the various jurisdictions have more often than not denied the privilege and construed the statutes strictly. It seems that
the privilege under state jurisdictions offers more hope
than at the FedeOal level, but the clergyman.s position in
the various states is by no means absolutely secure. The
states which have enacted the stronger type of statute on
the clergyman-privilege offer the most protection to the
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pastor. In these states which have the stronger or broadened
type of statute marriage counseling is sometimes considered
a valid relationship in which confidences may be considered
privileged under the law. Certain states have provided that
the pastor may possess the privilege as well as the counselee.
The California statute which is listed in the Appendix of this
paper on page sixty is an example of this type of statute.
The privilege in the states which have the narrow statute.
is much less secure. The court decisions in these states have
left little hope for a positive statement on the privilege in
these states. New statutes are definitedly needed in these
states.
There seems to be no logical basis upon which the courts
have decided cases concerning the clergyman-privilege. The
decisions have often been inconsistent from one jurisdiction
to another. Killhmann makes the following comment:
Unfortunately, the cases form no pattern and offer no
constructive guidelines for the clergyman. The courts
decision on the issue of privilege often seems to depend
more on the result the court wants to reach on the substantive issue in the case than on a logical application of the clergyman-privilege statute. One gets the
impression which cannot, however, be documented, that
where the court wants to reach a result that can best
be attained by exclusion of the clergyman.s testimony
it has interpreted the statute strictly; whereas, in
cases where the clergyman.s testimony is needed to reach
or fortify the desired result on the substantive issue,
the court has not hesitated to construe the statute
liberally. There is little rhyme or reason to the
cases. On the contrary, a view of the cases demonstrate
how uncertain and unpredictable the clergyman.s position
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In this light it behooves the minister to take precautions in his counseling situations. Denominations should
pass resolutions making it clear that their pastors are under
a church discipline to hear confessions and other communications relating to spiritual aid and comfort. Clergy should
make certain that counseling is conducted in a confidential
atomosphere. The pastor should have the counselee sign a
statement that the clergyman will not be called upon to testify in court to information gained in the counseling session.
Clergy should warn the counselee that the conversation may not
be privileged. The pastor should know his own state statute.143
The pastor should not be hampered in the performance of
his spiritual functions. Judge Fahy in Mullen v. United
States correctly stated the principle involved:
Sound policy—reason and experience--concedes to religious liberty a rule of evidence that a clergyman shall
not disclose on a trial the secret of a penitent's confidential confession to him, at least absent of the
penitential's consent. Knowledge so acquired in the
performance of a spiritual function as indicated in this
case is not to be transformed into evidence to be given
to the whole world....The rules of evidence have always
been concerned not onlyy
only with truth but with the manner
of its ascertainment.1
To this end, namely, the spiritual well-being of counselees,
the clergyman-privilege should be broadened and enacted more
firmly into statute law. This paper has sought to reveal
this need for stronger statutes which clergyman have often
not realized or neglected.
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APPENDIX
Below are listed the state statutes concerning the
clergyman-privilege. They are listed in alphabetical order.
The District of Columbia statute is included.
ALASKA. Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 43(b), Section

3.
A priest or clergyman shall not, without the consent
of the person making the confession, be examined as to
any confession made to him in his professional capacity,
in the course of discipline enjoined by the church to
which he belongs.
ARIZONA. Arizona Revised Statutes, Annotated, Paragraph 122233.
In a civil action a clergyman or priest shall not,
without the consent of the person making a confession,
be examined as to any confession made to hhn in his
character as clergyman or priest in the course of
discipline enjoined by the church to which he belongs.
IliVi;411WOMAIMA,

Arizona Revised Statutes, Annotated, Paragraph 13-

1802.
A person shall not be examined as a witness in the
following cases:
(Li.) A clergyman or priest, without consent of the person
making the confession, as to any confession made to him
in his professional character in the course of discipline
enjoined by the church to which he belongs.
ARKANSAS. Arkansas Statutes, Annotated, Paragraph 28-606.
No minister of the gospel or priest of any denomination
shall be compelled to testify in relation to any confession made to him in his professional character, in
the course of discipline enjoined by the rules or
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practice of such denomination.
CALIFORNIA. California Codes, Annotated, Paragraphs 10301034.
Paragraph 1030. "Clergyman".
As used in this article, "clergyman" means a priest,
minister, religious practitioner, or similar functionary
of a church or of a religious denomination or religious
organization.
Paragraph 1031. "Penitent".
As used in this article, "penitent" means a person who
has made a penitential communication to a clergyman.
Paragraph 1032. "Penitential Communication".
As used in this article, "penitential communication"
means a communication made in confidence, in the
presence of no third person so far as the penitent is
aware, to a clergyman who, in the course of the discipline or practice of his church, denomination, or
organization, is authorized or accustomed to hear such
communications, and, under the discipline or tenets of
his church, denomination, or organization has a duty
to keep such communications secret.
Paragraph 1033. "Privilege of Penitent".
Subject to Section 912, a penitent, whether or not a
party, has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to
prevent another from disclosing, a penitential communication if he claims the privilege.
Paragraph 1034. "Privilege of Clergyman".
Subject to Section 912, a clergyman, whether or not a
party, has a privilege to refuse to disclose a penitential communication if he claims the privilege.
. California Codes, Annotated, Paragraph 912.
Paragraph 912. "Waiver of privilege".
(A.) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the
right of any person to claim a privilege provided by...
Paragraph 1033 (privilege of penitent), and Paragraph
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1034 (privilege of clergyman) is waived with respect
to a communication protected by such privilege if
holder of the privilege, without coercion, has disclosed a significant part of the communication or has
consented to such disclosure made by anyone. Consent
to disclosure is manifested by any statement or other
conduct of the holder of the privilege indicating his
consent to the disclosure, including his failure to
claim the privilege in any proceeding in which he has
legal standing and opportunity to claim the privilege.
COLORADO. Colorado Revised Statutes, Annotated, Chapter 1%1-7(4).
(4). A clergyman or priest shall not be examined
without the consent of the person making the confession
as to any confession made to him in his professional
character in the course of discipline enjoined by the
church to which he belongs.
DELAWARE. Delaware Codes, Annotated, Title 10, Paragraph 4317.
No priest, clergyman, rabbi, "practitioner of Christian
Science", or other duly licensed, ordained, or consecrated minister of any religion shall be examined in
any civil or criminal proceedings in the courts of this
state-(1)with respect to any confession, or communication,
made to him, in his professional capacity in the course
of discipline enjoined by the church or other religious
body to which he belongs, without the consent of the
person making such confession or communication,
(2)with respect to any communication made to him, in
his professional capacity in the course of giving
religious or spiritual advice, without the consent of
the person seeking such advice, or
(3)with respect to any communication made to him, in
his professional capacity, by either spouse in connection with any effort to reconcile estranged spouses,
without the consent of the spouse making the communication.
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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. District of Columbia Codes, Annotated,
Paragraph 14-309.
An act to prohibit the examination in District of
Columbia courts of any minister of religion in connection with any communication made to him in his
professional capacity, without the consent of the
party to such communication.
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives
of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
that no priest, clergyman, rabbi, practitioner of
Christian Science, or other duly licensed, ordained, or
consecrated minister of any religion authorized to perform a marriage ceremony in the District of Columbia
shall be examined in any civil or criminal proceedings
in the courts of the District of Columbia-t1) with respect to any confession, or communication,
made to him, in his professional capacity in the course
of discipline enjoined by the church or other religious
body to which he belongs, without the consent of the
person making such confession or communications, or
(2)with respect to any communication made to him, in
his professional capacity in the course of giving religious or spiritual advice, without the consent of the
person seeking such advice, or
(3)with respect to any communication made to him, in
his professional capacity, by either spouse, in connection with any effort to reconcile estranged spouses,
without the consent of the spouse making the communication.
FLORIDA. Florida Statutes Annotated, Paragraph 90.2111.
(1) No minister of the gospel, no priest of the Catholic
church, no rector of the Episcopal church, no ordained
rabbi, no practitioner of Christian Science, and no
regular minister of religion of any religious organization or denomination usually referred to as a church,
over the age of twenty-one years, shall be allowed or
required in giving testimony as a witness in any litigation, to disclose any information communicated to
him in his professional capacity, and necessary to enable him to discharge the functions of his office ac-
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cording to the usual course of his practice or discipline, wherein such person so communication such information about himself or another is seeking spiritual
counsel and advice relative to and growing out of the
information so imparted.
(2)Such prohibition shall not apply to cases where the
communicating party, or parties, waives the right so
conferred by personal appearance in open court so declaring, or by affidavit properly sworn to by such a
one, or ones, before some person authorized to administer oaths, and filed with the court wherein litigation is pending.
(3)Nothing in this section shall modify or in anywise
change the law relative to "hearsay testimony".
(Ii) It shall be the duty of the judge of the court
wherein such litigation is pending, when such testimony as herein prohibited is offered, to determine
whether or not that person possesses the qualifications
which prohibit him from testifying to the communications sought to be proved by him.
GEORGIA. Code of Georgia, Annotated, Paragraph 38-419.1.
Every communication made by any person professing
religious faith, or seeking spiritual comfort, to any
Protestant minister of the Gospel, or to any priest
of the Roman Catholic faith, or to any Christian or
Jewish minister, by whatever name called, shall be
deemed privileged. No such minister, priest, or rabbi
shall disclose any communications made to him by any
such person professing religious faith, or seeking
spiritual guidance, or be competent or compellable to
testify with reference to any such communication in
any court.
HAWAII. Hawaii Revised Statutes, Paragraph 621-20.
No clergyman of any church or religious denomination
shall, without the consent of the person making the
confession, divulge in any action, suit, or proceeding,
whether civil or criminal, any confession made to him
in his professional character according to the uses of
the church or religious denomination to which he belongs.
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IDAHO. Idaho Codes, Annotated, Paragraph 9-203 (3).
A clergyman or priest aan not, without the consent of
the person making the confession, be examined as to
any confession made to him in his professional character in the course of discipline enjoined by the
church to which he belongs.
ILLINOIS. Illinois Revised Statutes, Annotated, Chapter 51,
Paragraph 10.1.
A clergyman, or priest, minister, rabbi or practitioner
of any religious denomination accredited by the religious
body to which he belongs, shall not be compelled to disclose in any court, or to any administrative board or
agency, or to any public officer, a confession or admission made to him in his professional character or as
a spiritual adviser in the course of the discipline enjoined by the rules or practices of such religious body
or of the religion which he professes, nor be compelled
to divulge any information which he obtained by him in
such professional character or as such spiritual adviser.
INDIANA. Indiana Statutes, Annotated, Paragraph 2-1714.
The following persons shall not be competent witnesses:
Fifth. Clergymen, as to confessions or admissions made
to them in course of discipline enjoined by their respective churches.
IOWA. Iowa Code, Annotated, paragraph 622.10.
No practicing attorney, counselor, physician, surgeon,
or the stenographer or confidential clerk of any such
person, who obtains such information by reason of his
employment, minister of the gospel or priest of any
denomination shall be allowed, in giving testimony, to
disclose any confidential communication properly entrusted to him in his professional capacity, and necessary and groper to enable him to discharge the functions of his uffice according to the usual course of
practice or discipline. Such prohibition shall not
apply to cases where the person in whose favor the
same is made waives the rights conferred...
(Last part refers to a physician in a civil suit.)
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KANSAS. Kansas Civil Procedures Statutes, Annotated, Paragraph 60-429.
(A.) Definitions. As used in this section,
(1) the term "duly ordained minister of religion, means
a person who has been ordained, in accordance with the
ceremonial ritual, or dsicipline of a church, religious
sect, or organization established on the basis of a
community of faith and belief, doctrines and practices
of a religious character, to preach and to teach the
doctrines of such church, sect, or organization and to
administer the rites and ceremonies thereof in public
worship, and who as his regular and customary vocation
preaches and teaches the principles of religion and
administers the ordinances of public worship as embodied
in the creed or principles of such church, sect, or
organization;
t2) the term "regular minister of religion" means one
who as his customary vocation preaches and teaches the
principles of religion of a church, a religious sect, or
organization of which he is a member, without having been
formally ordained as a minister of religion, and who is
recognized by such church, sect, or organization as a
regular minister;
k3) the term "regular or duly ordained minister of
religion" does not include a person who irregularly or
incidentally preaches and teaches the principles of
religion of a church, religious sect, or organization
and does not include any person who may have been duly
ordained a minister in accordance with the ceremonial,
rite, or discipline of a church, religious sect or organization, but who does not regularly, as a vocation,
teach and preach the principles of religion and administer the ordinances of public worship as embodied in
the creed or principles of his church, sect, or organization;
(Lb) "penitent" means a person who recognizes the existence and the authority of God and who seeks or receives from a regular or duly ordained minister of
religion advice or assistance in determining or discharging his moral obligations, or in obtaining God's
mercy or forgiveness for past culpable conduct;
(5) "penitential communication" means any communication between a penitent and a regular or duly ordained

66
minister of religion which the penitent intends shall
be kept secret and confidential and which pertains to
advice or assistance in determining or discharging the
penitent's moral obligations, or to obtaining Godis
mercy or rorgiveness for past culpable conduct.
(B.) Privilege. A person, whether or not a party, has
a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent a
witness from disclosing a communication if he claims
the privilege and the judge finds that
(1)the communication was a penitential communication and
(2)the witness is the penitent or the minister, and
(3)the claimant is the penitent, or the minister making
claim on behalf of an absent penitent.
KENTUCKY. Kentucky Revised Statutes, Annotated, Paragraph
421.210 (4).
(4)nor shall a clergyman or priest testify concerning
any confession made to him, in his professional character,
in the course of discipline enjoined by the church to
which he belongs, without the consent of the person confessing.
LOUISIANA. Louisiana Criminal Procedures Code, Annotated,
Paragraph 15.477.
Paragraph 15-47?. Privileged communications to clergymen.
No clergyman is permitted, without the consent of the
person making the communication, to disclose any communication made to him in confidence by one seeking his
spiritual advice or consolation, or any information that
he may have gotten by reason of such communication.
W411,04wrim,

Louisiana Criminal Procedures Code, Annotated,

Paragraph 15-478.
Paragraph 15-478. Right to exclude testimony; nature of
privilege; waiver.
The right to exclude the testimony, as provided in the
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three articles last preceding, is purely personal, and
can be set up only by the person in whose favor the right
exists. If the right is waived, the legal adviser, the
physician and the clergyman, as the case may be, may be
examined and cross-examined to the same extent as any
other witness.
MAINE. Maine Revised Statutes, Title 16, Paragraph 57.
Paragraph

57.

"Privileged communications; clergymen".

(A.) Definitions. "Clergyman" means a priest, rabbi,
clergyman, minister of the gospel or other officer of
a church or of a religious denomination or organization
who in the course of its discipline or practice is
authorized or accustomed to hear, and has a duty to
keep secret, penitential communications made by members
of his church, denomination or organization;
(2)"genitent" means a member of a church or religious
denomination or organization who has made a penitential
communication to a clergyman thereof;
(3)"Penitential communication" means a confession of
culpable conduct made secretly and in confidence by a
penitent to a clergyman in the course of the discipline
or practice of the church or religious denomination or
organization of which the penitent is a member.
(B.) Privilege. A person, whether or not a party, has
a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent a
witness from disclosing, a communication if he claims
the privilege and the judge finds that the communication was a penitential communication and the witness
is the penitent or the clrgyman, and the claimant is
the penitent or the clergyman, making the claim on
behalf of an absent penitent.
MARYLAND. Maryland Annotated Code, Article 35, Paragraph 13.
No minister of the Gospel, clergyman or priest of an
established church, of any denomination, shall be compelled to testify in relation to any confession or communication made to him in confidence by one seeking his
spiritual advice or consolation.
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MASSACHUSETTS. Massachusetts Annotated Laws, Chapter 233,
Paragraph 20A.

Paragraph 20A. "Certain Communications to Priests,
Rabbis, Ministers, and Christian Science Practitioners
Shall Be Privileged."
A priest, rabbi, or ordained or licensed minister of
any church or an accredited Christian Science practitioner shall not, without the consent of the person
making the confession, be allowed to disclose a confession made to him in his professional character, in
the course of discipline enjoined by the rules or
practice of the religious body to which he belongs;
nore shall a priest, rabbi or ordained or licensed
minister of any church or an accredited Christian
Science practitioner testify as to any communication
made to him by any person in seeking religious or
spiritual advice or comfort, or as to his advice given
thereon in the course of his professional duties or in
his professional character, without the consent of such
person.
MICHIGAN. Michigan Statutes, Annotated, Paragraph 27A. 2156.
No minister of the gospel, or priest of any denomination whatsoever, or duly accredited Christian Science
practitioner, shall be allowed to disclose any confessions made to him in his professional character, in
the course of discipline enjoined by the rules or practice of such denomination.
MINNESOTA. Minnesota Statutes, Annotated, Paragraph 595.02(3).
(3) A clergyman or other minister of any religion shall
not, without the consent of the party making the confession, be allowed to disclose a confession made to him
in his professional character, in the course of discipline enjoined by the rules or practice of the religious
body to which he belongs; nor shall a clergyman or other
minister of any religion be examined as to any communication made to him by any person seeking religious or spiritual advice, aid, or comfort or his advice given thereon
in the course of his professional character, without the
consent of such person.
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MISSOURI. Missouri Revised Statutes, Annotated, Paragraph
491.060t4).
Paragraph 491.060. The following persons shall be incompetent to testify:
(14.) A minister of the gospel or priest of any denomination, concerning a confession made to him in his professional character, in the course of discipline enjoined by the rules of practice of such denomination.
MONTANA. Revised Codes of Montana, Paragraph 93-701-4.
(3)A clergyman or priest cannot,: without the consent
of the person making the confession, be examined as to
any confession made to him in his professional character in the course of discipline enjoined by the
church to Which he belongs.
irmft11.01,00

Revised Codes of Montana, Paragraph 94-8801.

The rules for determining the competency of witnesses
in civil actions are applicable also to criminal actions
and proceedings, except as otherwise provided in this
code.
NEBRASKA. Nebraska Revised Statutes, Paragraph 25-1201.
Paragraph 25-1201. "Witnesses; incompetent, when."
Every human being of sufficient capacity to understand the obligation of an oath is a competent witness in all cases, civil and criminal, except as
otherwise herein declared. The following persons
shall be incompetent to testify:
(4) a clergyman or priest, concerning any confession
made to him in his professional character in the course
of discipline enjoined by the church to Which he belongs,
without the consent of the person making the confession.

Nebraska Revised Statutes, Paragraph 25-1206.
Paragraph 25-1206. "Witnesses; other privileged relations; communications; competency."
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No practicing attorney, counselor, physician, surgeon,
minister of the gospel or priest of any denomination,
shall be allowed in giving testimony to disclose any
confidential communication, properly entrusted to him
in his professional capacity, and necessary and proper
to enable him to discharge the functions of his office
according to the usual course of practice or discipline.
NEVADA. Nevada Revised Statutes, Paragraph 48.070.
Paragraph 48.070. "Confessor and confessant relationship."
A clergyman or priest shall not, without the consent
of the person making the confession, be examined as a
witness as to any confession made to him in his pro
fessional character.
NEW JERSEY. New Jersey Statutes, Annotated, Paragraph
2A: 84A*23.
2A: o4A-23. "Priest-penitent privilege. Rule 29."
Subject to Rule 37, a clergyman, minister or other
person or practitioner authorized to perform similar
functions, of any religion shall not be allowed or
compelled to disclose a confession or other confidential communication made to him in his professional
character, or as a spiritual advisor in the course of
the discipline or practice of the religious body to
which he belongs or of the religion which he professes.
New Jerse; Statutes, Annotated, Paragraph 2A: 84A-29,
Rule

37.
Paragraph 2A: 84A-29, Rule 37. "Waiver of privilege by
contract or previous disclosure; limitations.
A person waives his right or privilege to refuse to
disclose or to prevent another from disclosing a specified matter if he or any other person while the holder
thereof has (a) contracted with anyone not to claim the
right or privilege or, (b) without coercion and with
knowledge of his right or privilege, made disclosure of
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any part of the privileged matter or consented to such
a disclosure made by anyone.
A disclosure which is itself privileged or otherwise
protected by the common law, statutes or rules of court
of this State, or by lawful contract, shall not constitute a waiver under this section. The failure of a
witness to claim a right or privilege with respect to
the first question shall not operate as a waiver with
respect to any other question.
NEW MEXICO. New Mexico Statutes, Annotated, Paragraph 20-1-12.
Paragraph 20-1.12. "Privileged communications."
(c) A clergyman cannot, without the consent of the person making the confessieno rbeJexathined as .to .ny- O=4:
Passion or disclosure made to him in his professional
character.
(P) If a person offer himself as a witness and voluntarily testify with reference to the communications
specified in this act, that is to be deemed a consent
to the examination of the person to whom the communications were made as above provided.
NEW YORK. New York Civil Practice Law, raragraph 4.505.
Paragraph 4505. "Confidential communication to clergy
privileged."
tin less the person confessing or confiding waives the
privilege, a clergyman, or other minister of any religion or duly accredited Christian Science practitioner,
shall not be allowed to disclose a confession or confidence made to him in his professional character as
spiritual advisor.
NORTH CAROLINA. North Carolina General Statutes, raragraph
0-53.1.
Paragraph 1.53.1. "Communications between clergymen and
communicants."
No priest, rabbi, accredited Christian Science practitioner, Qr a clergyman or ordained minister of an
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established church shall be competent to testify in any
action, suit or proceeding concerning any information
which was communicated to him and entrusted to him in
his professional capacity, and necessary to enable him
to discharge the functions of his office according to
the usual course of his practice or discipline, wherein
such person so communicating such information about himself or another is seeking spiritual counsel and advice
relative to and growing out of the information so imparted provided, however, that this section shall not
apply where communicant in open court waives the privilege conferred.
NORTH DAKOTA. North Dakota Century Code, paragraph 31-01-06.
Paragraph 31-ul-u6. "Attorneys, clergyman, priests,
physicians, surgeons, and public officers cannot testify regarding confidential communications."
A person cannot be examined as a witness in the following cases:
(2)
, A clergyman or priest, without the consent of the
person making the confession, cannot be examined as to
any confession made to him in his professional character in the course of discipline enjoined by the church
to which he belongs.
OHIO. Ohio Revised Codes, Annotated, Paragraph 2317.02.
Paragraph 2317.02. The following person shall not
testify in certain respects:
(B) A clergyman or priest, concerning a confession
made to him in his professional character in the
course of discipline enjoined by the church to which
he belongs.
OKLAHOMA. Oklahoma Statutes, Annotated, Title 12, Paragraph
385.
Paragraph 3o5. "Persons incompetent to testify enumerated."
The following persons shall be incompetent to testify:
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(5.) A clergyman or priest, concerning any confession
made to him in his professional character in the course
of discipline enjoined by the church to which he belongs,
without the consent of the person making the confession.
OREGON. Oregon Revised Statutes, Paragraph 44.040.
Paragraph 44.040. "Confidential Communications".
(C) A priest or clergyman shall not, without the consent of the person making the confession, be examined
as to any confession made to him in his professional
character, in the course of discipline enjoined by the
church to which he belongs.
PENNSYLVANIA. Pennsylvania Statutes, Annotated, Title 28,
Paragraph 331.
Paragraph 331. "Confiential Communications to Clergymen."
No clergyman, priest, rabbi or minister of the gospel
of any regularly established church or religious organization, except clergymen or ministers, who are selfordained or who are members of religious organizations
in which members other than the leader thereof are
deemed clergymen or ministers, who while in the course
of his duties has acquired information from any person
secretly and in confidence shall not be compelled, or
allowed without consent of such person, to disclose
that information in any legal proceeding, trial or investigation before any grand jury, traverse or petit
jury, or any officer thereof, before the General Assembly
or any committee thereof, or before any commission,
department or bureau of this Commonwealth, or municipal
body, officer or committee thereof.
RHODE ISLAND. General Laws of Rhode Island, Annotated,
Paragraph 9-17-23.
raragraph

9-17-23.

"Privileged Communications to clergymen."

In the trial of every cause, both civil and criminal,
no clergyman or priest shall be competent to testify
concerning any confession made to him in his professional
character in the course of discipline enjoined by the
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church to which he belongs, without the consent of the
person making the confession. No duly ordained minister of the gospel, priest or rabbi of any denomination shall be allowed in giving testimony to disclose
any confidential communication, properly entrusted to
him in his professional capacity, and necessary and
proper to enable him to discharge the functions of his
office in the usual course of practice or discipline,
without the consent of the person making such communication.
SOUTH CAROLINA. Code of Laws of South Carolina, Annotated,
Paragraph 26-409.
Paragraph 26-409. "Ministers priests, and rabbis not
required to disclose confidential communications."
In any legal or quasi-legal trial, hearing or proceeding before any court, commission or committee no
regular or duly ordained minister, priest or rabbi
shall be required, in giving testimony, to disclose
any confidential communication properly entrusted to
him in his professional capacity and necessary and
proper to enable him to discharge the functions of his
office according to the usual course of practice or
discipline of his church or religious body. This prohibition shall not apply to cases where the party in
whose favor it is made waives the rights conferred.
SOUTH DAKOTA. South Dakota Compiled Laws, 1961, Annotated,
Paragraph ly-2-2.
A clergyman or priest cannot, without the consent of
the person making the confession, be examined as to
any confession made to him in his professions.; character in the course of discipline enjoined in the
church to which he belongs.
TENNESSEE. Tennessee Codes, Annotated, Paragraph 24-109.
Paragraph 24-109. "Clergymen--Communications
Confidential--Testimony prohibited--Waiver"
No minister of the gospel, no priest of the Catholic
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Church, no rector of the Episcopal Church, no ordained
rabbi, and no regular minister of religion of any religious organization or denomination usually referred
to as a church, over the age of twenty-one years, shall
be allowed or required in giving testimony as a witness
in any litigation, to disclose any information communicated to him in a confidentail manner, properly
entrusted to him in his professional capacity, and necessary to enable him to discharge the functions of his
office according to the usual course of his practice or
discipline, wherein such person so communicating such
information about himself or another is seeking spiritual counsel and advice relative to and growing out of
the information so imparted.
Such prohibition shall not apply to cases where the
communicating party, or parties, waives the right so
conferred by personal appearance in open court so declaring, or by an affidavit properly sworn to by such
a one or ones, before some person authorized to administer oaths, and filed with the court wherein litigation is pending. Nothing in this section shall modify
or in anywise change the law relative to "hearsay
testimony."
. Tennessee Codes, Annotated, Paragraph 24-110.
Paragraph 24-110. "Penalty when clergyman testifies
contrary to preceding section."
Any minister of the gospel, priest of the Catholic
Church, rector of the Episcopal Church, ordained rabbi,
and any regular minister of religion of any religious
organization or denomination usually referred to as a
church, violating the provisions of Paragraph 24-109,
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and fined not less
than fifty dollars ($50.00) and imprisoned in the
county jail or workhouse not exceeding six (6) months.
UTAH. Utah Code, Annotated, Paragraph 78-24-8(3).
Paragraph 78-2L.-8. "Privileged Communications."
(3) A clergyman or priest cannot, without the consent
of the person making the confession, be examined as to
any confession made to him in his professional character in the course of discipline enjoined by the church
to which he belongs.
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VERMONT. Vermont Statutes, Annotated, Paragraph 12-1607.
Paragraph 1607. "Priests and Ministers."
A priest or minister of the gospel shall not be permitted to testify in court to statements made to him
by a person under the sanctity of a religious confessional.
VIRGINIA. Virginia Code, Annotated, Paragraph 8-289.2.
Paragraph 8-289.2. "Communications between ministers
of religion and persons they counsel or advise."
No regular minister of religion, over the age of twentyone years, of any religious organization or denomination usually referred to as a church, shall be required
in giving testimony as a witness in any civil action to
disclose any information communicated to him in a confidential manner, properly entrusted to him in his professional capacity and necessary to enable him to discharge the functions of his office according to the
usual course of his practice or discipline, wherein
such person so communicating such information about himself or another is seeking spiritual counsel and advise
relative to and growing out of the information so imparted.
WASHINGTON. Washington Revised Code, Annotated, Paragraph
5.60.060.
Paragraph 5.60.060. "Who are disqualified--Privileged
Communications."
(3) A clergyman or priest shall not, without the consent
of the person making the confession be examined as to
any confession made to him in his professional character,
in the course of discipline enjoined by the church to
which he belongs.
WEST VIRGINIA. West Virginia Code, Annotated, raragraph 50-610.
Paragraph 50-610. "Persons Incompetent To Testify."
The following persons are incompetent to testify as hereinafter provided, and not otherwise:
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(d) A minister, clergyman or priest of any religious
denomination, concerning any confession made to him
according to the course of discipline enjoined by the
church to which he belongs.
WISCONSIN. Wisconsin Statutes, Annotated, Paragraph 325.20.
Paragraph 325.20. "Confessions to Clergymen."
A clergyman or other minister of any religion shall
not be allowed to disclose a confession made to him
in his professional character, in the course of discipline enjoined by the rules or practice of the religious body to which he belongs, without consent
thereto by the party confessing.
WYOMING. Wyoming Statutes, Annotated. Paragraph 1-139.
Paragraph 1-139. "Privileged Communication and Acts."
The following persons shall not testify in certain
respects:
(2) A clergyman or priest, concerning a confession
made to him in his professional character, in the
course of discipline enjoined by the church to which
he belongs.
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